While the November referendum has ended the most recent effort for a city-owned water company, the decision of ownership is not the only challenge that has faced Lexington's water service in recent years. In this three-part series, writer William Grier takes an in-depth look at the potential threats of an inadequate water supply and how organizations have tried to address the matter in recent years, discussing the many options that have been explored to ensure that the proverbial well doesn't run dry.
"
The drought of 1988 may have been one of the best things to happen to Lexington in a long time.
If, in August of that year, one had made that statement, men in white jumpers would have appeared at his door and the ancestry of his kids would have been questioned by their schoolmates.
As droughts go, however, this one was a small-timer - a faint speck on the radar screen of drought emergencies. Still, it awakened Lexington to the fact that the Kentucky River, where we get our water, is not a completely reliable source. Mother Nature simply gave us a wake-up call.
Since it first became our primary source of water, no one had really questioned the point that this river always had plenty of water in it for our use. The 1988 drought changed all that thinking and began a chain of events - some good and some bad - that are still unfolding.
A brief history
The Kentucky River first became our primary source of water as a result of the drought of 1930, known in U.S. history books as the "Dust Bowl."
Prior to this, Lexington's water supply was from the lakes we see from Richmond and New Circle Roads. In that simpler day, when a washing machine on a front porch was more of a status symbol than a year-round green lawn, the per-capita water use was much less than today. Automatic water-using devices were a novelty, and many families were just getting used to indoor plumbing. Lawn sprinkling was only for the few, rich folk and driving a dirty car, for those who had one, was no shame.
The drought of 1930 began in April of that year, when rainfall slowed down from its normal rate and mud rings began to appear around these reservoirs. By fall, the situation became obviously desperate. With no relief in sight, work was begun in October of that same year to build a 20-inch pipeline to the Kentucky River, more than six miles from the closest reservoir. This line and pumping station were completed in 70 days, but by that time some rain had fallen, and the reservoirs were beginning to fill. The crisis was over, but since that time, the Kentucky River has been our primary water source.
The drought of 1930 is the worst in recent history and is the one against which all droughts are measured. It lasted about six months - from early July until mid-December, and for several weeks in October the flow in the Kentucky River was measured as about 6 million gallons per day (mgd). The water level in the river would have been below the crest of the dams, and 6 mgd is the amount of water leaking through the closed lock gates. The pool created by lock and dam #9 contained water that was pumped into Jacobson Reservoir after the line was built.
There have been other droughts, including some more recent. The second-worst occurred in 1953. The wake-up call of 1988 was due not only to low stream flow but also to pumping capacity shortage and the fact that the Kentucky Division of Water required a certain amount of water to flow downstream, which therefore could not be pumped. The droughts of 1999 and 2000 served as a sort of "backup" to the fact that something must be done about our water supply. This fact was punctuated by the 1988 and 1999 droughts, when we were restricted on how water could be used. Non-essential water uses were eliminated. Lawn sprinkling was curtailed, then eliminated, for a period of time during these droughts. Some industries, such as car washes, were shut down completely. Other industries were on the verge of being shut down or curtailed on their water use before the rains came. More troubling than a brown lawn or dying shrubs is the fact that the 1988, 1999, and 2000 droughts were not really bad ones. Compared to the 1930 event, or even the 1953 event, these were pretty mild, except for a few weeks we had to cut back on the way we use water. The question is: What will we do when we have a truly serious drought?
The Kentucky American Water Company has water plants with a combined rating of 70 mgd, all of which has been used lately, even during just a "dry spell." State regulatory agencies will not let them expand their plant capacity because the flow in the Kentucky River will not support a greater withdrawal during even a mild drought, much less a severe one. The "average" flow in the Kentucky River is about 80 times the "average" (annual) usage in the Kentucky American service area, but this has little applicable meaning. There is no way to store water during high flows for use during a drought, and that is part of the problem.
The Lexington area peak summertime projected water demand in the year 2030 is about 90 to 100 mgd. Considering that during the 1930 drought, the flow in the Kentucky River was about 6 mgd for several weeks and in the drought month of October 1999, it dropped to about 35 mgd to 60 mgd, we have a significant potential water supply gap that needs to be addressed.
To the people who concern themselves with our water supply, this problem is no secret. Several attempts have been made toward a solution, but to date only small things have been put in place. These small things are better than nothing, but the real, long-term solution is yet to be accomplished and will cost money. Our water supply problem will not go away or solve itself. It must be done and paid for by us.
Kentucky River Locks and Dams
We look on the Kentucky River as a natural stream, but it is really a series of pools behind the 14 locks and dams that were built from 1835 through 1917 to float coal barges from the eastern Kentucky coalfields to the downstream markets. It was a transportation system that was outdated before it was completed. By the time the last lock and dam was finished in 1917, railroads had penetrated the coal fields and relatively little coal was ever barged through these locks. Beginning with the 1930 drought, the pools created by the locks and dams became more valuable as sources of water to the nearby communities than they ever were for hauling coal. Today, 12 cities draw their water directly from the main-stem of the river, and several others draw water from the various tributaries. Two electric power plants use Kentucky River water for cooling and several industries use it for various industrial purposes.
The first eight dams were made of wood timbers/planking with stone lock walls. The upper six locks and dams are made of un-reinforced concrete. All of them have undergone extensive repair over the years, but are in less-than-pristine condition today. The potential for the failure of L/D's #9 (where the Kentucky American intake is located) and #10 (immediately above the Kentucky American intake) is greater than most of the other structures. The failure of a lock or dam would leave the water intake(s) in that pool high and dry and totally unable to function.
The small thing that has been done to increase our water supply is the installation of a release valve in most of the dams. These valves permit the transfer of water stored in the upstream pools to the downstream communities, including Lexington. This relatively small amount of stored water in these pools helps to reduce the impact of water-use restrictions created by small droughts, like the 1999 and 2000 events, but have little impact on a major drought like the 1930 event.
These valves, however, do not address the real issue. Efforts to fix Lexington's water supply problem date back almost two decades, but little real progress has been made during that time toward an effective solution.
In the next issue of Business Lexington, this series will identify the many groups and organizations assembled to address the city's water supply concerns along with the obstacles and points of contention that have blocked their progress.